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ABSTRACT
Thispaper aims to remedy difficulties with some extant empirical
tests of the monetary approach to exchange rate determination. Four
problems are addressed: explication of and allowance for real exchange
rate changes; imposition of interest parity; use of the forward rate as
an unbiased predictor of the spot rate; and modeling implications of
official intervention in foreign exchange markets and of possible efforts
to sterilize effects of intervention in the monetary base.
Empirical tests conducted with monthly data on the dollar—DM exchange
rate from March, 1973 —December,1979 do not permit rejection of the
complex joint hypothesis represented by equations estimated to test the
monetary approach. Still, there remained unexplained a large portion of
the behavior of the dollar—DM exchange rate in the 1973—79 monthly sample
employed. This result suggests that exchange rates may be viewed as
prices determined in asset markets where a large and unsystematic flow of
information, not captured by monetary or other variables, produces large,
unsystematic movements.
Professor John H. Makin
Department of Economics, DK—30
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington 98195
(206) 543—5955 (5865)Empirical tests of the monetary approach to exchange rate deter--
mination have not so far been very satisfactory. To my knowledge no
study has yet attempted to incorporate, either in theory or testing,
the fact that exchange rates have not ever been freely flexible and
that the most recent episode of "floatingt' has seen widespread offi-
cial intervention in foreign exchange markets. Sterilization has, in
many instances, been evident as well.
Problems With Empirical Tests of the
Monetary Approach
Further difficulties have persisted. Many tests of the monetary
approach include an interest differential (or equivalently, given in-
terest parity, a forward premium) among independent, "exogenous" vari-
ables which are to explain exchange rate behavior. Included in this
group are studies by Bilson (1978, 1979), Hodrick (1978), Bisignano
(1980) and Dornbusch (1980). Inclusion of an interest differential
as an exogenous variable in an exchange rate equation is not consis-
tent with imposing interest parity and unbiasedness of the forward rate
as a predictor of the spot rate. Once these conditions, for which
there is considerable empirical support, are imposed, a rational solu-
tion for an exchange rate does not involve an interest differential or
forward premium. This is well—known and has been demonstrated by
Bilson (1978, 1979) for freely flexible exchange rates and extended to
the case of limited flexibility of exchange rates by Makin (1980). In
fact, inclusion of an interest differential term is likely to cause
rejection of the monetary approach. This will be demonstratedbelow.2
Onestudyby Caves and Feige (1980) properly incorporates im-
plications of rationality into proposed empirical tests of the mone-
tary approach. Unfortunately, however, Caves and Fe:Lge conduct all
of their tests using relative money supplies instead of relative excess
money supplies as specified by the monetary approach under rationality.
This study proposes to remedy some of these difficulties. Em-
pirical results obtained so far, which are reported below, are consis-
tent with monetary approach to exchange rate determination, though ex-
planatory power of the estimated equations is not high. While tests
of a single exchange rate, the DM—dollar rate, cannot be regarded as
definitive, it is clear that, so far, empirical testing fails to con-
tradict the hypothesis that foreign exchange markets are best viewed
as securities markets where behavior of asset prices is largely deter-
mined by large and steady volume of new information, most of which is
impossible to predict ex ante or even to measure systematically, ex post.
Alternatives to the Monetary Approach
An obvious alternative hypothesis to explain results obtained
here would be that the monetary approach to exchange rate determination
is an inadequate or crucially incomplete theory. Various forms of what
may be called an "asset approach" to exchange rate determination are
developed in Dornbusch (1980) and Dornbusch and Fischer (1980). While
the asset approach embodies a useful extension of the fundamental mone-
tary approach notion that exchange rates are determined by stock equili-
brium conditions, it has in some cases been construed to imply aban-
donment of the monetary approach for what, it will be argued here, may
be the wrong reasons. Further, in some cases there are advanced,3
alternative empirical tests which require fulfillment of a very complex
joint hypothesis in order to test primary hypotheses about "asset
approach" .ehavior.
In choosing to refine the monetary approach rather than follow the
alternative asset approach this study expands that monetary—equilibrium—
rational—expectations (MERE) model of Bilson (1978, 1979). The aim is
to derive a MERE model which adequately represents to post—Bretton—Woods
system of controlled and varying degrees of permissible flexibility of
exchange rates.
Joint Hypothesis Under Monetary Approach
The HERE approach as developed here yields a reduced—form expres-
sion for an exchange rate, estimation of which involves testing a joint
hypothesis maintaining simultaneous satisfaction of:(1) a stable de-
mand function for money; (2) purchasing power parity (PPP); (3)
interest parity;(4) the forward exchange rate as an unbiased pre-
dictor of the spot rate; (5) stable intervention and sterilization
behavior; (6) representation of real exchange or interest rate
changes which may occur and (7) a model employed to project expected
future behavior of relevant exogenous variables.
Each of these hypotheses was tested separately using relevant
monthly data from March, 1973 through December, 1979 for determinants
of the U.S. dollar price of Deutsche Marks (DM). While none of the
relationships held perfectly, most glaring inconsistencies arose from,
first, the well—known failure of PPP in the presence of persistent real
appreciation of the DM against the dollar and second, evidence of4
distinct episodes of altered intervention and sterilization behavior
within the sample period. These matters are given close attention
in tests of the MERE joint hypothesis conducted in Section 3.
Risk and "Real" Exchange Rates
Attention to riskiness of nominal assets as a determinant of
real interest rates constitutes another part of the attempted exten-
sion of MERE under discussion here. Emphasis is placed upon riski-
ness of financial assets as a store of purchasing power over commodities.
A rise in inflation volatility causes risk—averse holders of financial
assets to demand a risk premium to compensate for uncertainty of
purchasing power over commodities. The result is a rise in the real
interest rate which adds to the positive impact upon nominal interest
arising from a higher level of inflation. While the higher real rate
is required for those whose purchases are largely denominated in
local currency, it represents an above—equilibrium return for those
(foreigners) whose commodity purchases are largely denominated in some
other currency. If, for example, a rise in inflation—volatility in
Germany relative to inflation volatility in the U.S. causes inflation
level adjusted real returns (for U.S. investors) to rise in Germany
relative to the U.S., the DM will appreciate. This proposition is
tested with measures of U.S. and German inflation volatility. In
effect, changes in relative inflation uncertainty are taken as a
proxy for exogenous changes in real interest rates.5
Overview
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 presents a brief
discussion of the relationship between MERE and the portfolio approach
to exchange rate determination. Section 2 outlines the extended MERE
theory of exchange rate behavior and derives a testable rational ex-
pression for an exchange rate. That expression is incorporated into
a theory of international capital flows. Section 3 presents empiri-
cal tests of the MERE formulation of exchange rate behavior. Section
4 presents some concluding remarks.6
1. MONETARY ANDASSETAPPROACHES TO EXCHANGE
RATE DETERMINATION
Asset Approach
Anextensive comparison of monetary and asset approaches to ex-
change rate determination is presented in Dornbusch (1980). Offered
here are comments on some of the more salient features of the distinc-
tion. Clearly, neither approach is superior in every respect. The
monetary approach, which really is a restricted form of asset approach
is more analytically precise and therefore lends itself more readily
to refutation by empirical testing. Therefore, it may be preferable
at a time when relatively little is known about explaining a large
part of the observable movements in exchange rates.
Distinguishing features of the asset approach are:(1) depen-
dence of money demand (and aggregate demand) on wealth in addition to
income; (2) emphasis upon, though not a requirement of, imperfect
substitutability of assets; (3) possible movements in real yields on
securities traded internationally.
These features deserve some comment. Dependence of money demand
on wealth and consideration of ttrealtt yields leads to estimation of
exchange rate equations which include proxies for these variables such
as current account "surprises" employed by Dornbusch (1980). Both
wealth and real yields are notoriously difficult to measure and so one
always ends up testing the compound hypothesis that (a) the theory
is correct and (b) one has properly measured some concept of wealth
or real yields. In many cases this is unavoidable and, indeed, the7
"proxy—use—syndrome" appears later in this paper. Empirical tests
discussed in Section 3 contain a proxy for real interest rates. But
this is an "add—on" part of the investigation and not an integral
part as it is with most empirical tests of the asset approach.
A basic reservation about the asset approach arises from the fact
that an investigator ends up estimating exchange rate equations with
numerous prefiltered series on "exogenous" variables on the right—
hand—side. Using Dornbusch (1980) as an example, we find that ex-
change rate depreciation depends on:1 (1) unanticipated current
account imbalances: (2) unanticipated real output growth at home
and abroad; (3) unanticipated (from autoregression) home—foreign
interest differentials and (4) "residuals from a regression of
(home—foreign) short term interest differentials on differentials be-
tween (home) and (foreign) country on long—term and short—term interest
rates, unemployment rates, and inflation rates, with all explanatory
variables lagged one period."2
This specification contains a very large number of maintained
hypotheses regarding adequacy of various proxies for "news" about cur-
rent account cyclical movements and interest rates, and requires that "un—
anticipated" movements, variously defined, of exchange rates and interest
rate differentials are not simultaneously determined in a manner defined by
the interest parity equation. While the proxy problem is impossible
to avoid completely, it is necessary to recognize that use of "un-
anticipated" variables requires satisfaction of the hypothesis that
the investigator has ex post measured "anticipated" behavior of8
variables as seen ex ante by decision—makers within the actual sample
period under investigation. This may be a questionable assumption
in view of the fact that most "unanticipated" filters are estimated
using data from the full sample period under investigation which on
average was only partially available to those whose expectations
formations are being modeled.
Monetary Approach
The monetary approach to exchange rate determination is often
rejected on the grounds that the purchasing power parity condition which
it imposes is not empirically valid. While empirical failure of PPP
is well—documented, this may not be the major difficulty with fre-
quently reported tests of the simple monetary approach. Most descrip-
tions of the monetary approach, like that of Dornbusch (1980), do not
impose upon their formulations either interest parity or rationality
(which follows from imposition of the condition whereby the forward
rate is an unbiased predictor of the spot rate and then solving for
the spot rate). As a result the exchange rate ends up being deter-
mined by relative excess money supplies and an interest differential
(as in equation (3) of Dornbusch (1980)).9
* * *
s rn—rn —b(r—r) h(y—y ) (I)
where (all natural logarithms):
s =logarithmof spot exchange rate (home currency price of
foreign exchange)
m =logarithmof nominal money
y =logarithmof real income
rlogarithm of one plus nominal interest rate
h=incomeelasticity of money demand
b =interestelasticity of money demand with respect to "r"
"*"denotesforeign
Note that interest parity implies
* s—f=r—r (2)
where f =logarithmof forward rate. If we let
(3)
where =aconstant
E= randomerror term with mean zero and variance
equations (2) and (3) imply:
st=c+(r*_r)+E (4)
Equation (4) suggests that estimation of (1) with a constant term will,
given interest parity, leave measures of relative excess money as re-
dundant variables in what is reai.1.y an interest parity equation.10
Actual results may differ somewhat if (3) mis—specifies behavior of
the forward rate and measures of relative excess money operate on
it.3 The result anticipated hereis, however consistent with the
finding by Dornbusch (1980) that the interest differential emerges as
the only significant variable in an equation like (1) [with nominal
interest rates in place of rJ.
An adequate representation of any theory of exchange rate behavior
should impose the interest parity condition which represents steady
state arbitrage in asset markets. This condition, with considerable
empirical support, enters the forward rate into an equation such as
(1). Then, representation of the forward rate as an unbiased predictor
of the future spot rate enables a rational solution for the exchange rate
exclusively in terms of exogenous determinants of all expected future
values of the relative [home versus foreign) excess supply of money.
This is the Bilson (1978, 1979) MERE solution which is extended below
in Section 2 to include intervention and sterilization behavior.
Eliminating The PPP Problem
The monetary approach still suffers from the assumption of pur-
chasing power parity which is not sustained by the data. An obvious
way to deal with this problem, which will be employed in empirical
tests of MERE,is to Investigate the nature of "real" exchange rate
behavior over the sample period under investigation. Write PPP as:
=(pt_pt*)+ (5)11
where is the log of the "real" exchange rate. For the dollar—DM
exchange rate during the 1973—79 sample period, follows a random
walk (Box—Pierce test for autocorrelations: Q(12)17.9;
Q(24) =25.7;Q(36) =34.6):
=-.l+ v (5.a)
where v ="whitenoise" residuals from an AR—l model on (vn,a2).
=
A(p_p*)t+ v (5.b)
Equation (5.b) indicates that PPP is satisfied by first differencing
logs. All exchange rate equations reported below in Section 3 are
estimated in log first—difference form.




The model to be presented here draws on Makin (1980). The log






m =logof money supply (m =m
=m)
Pt =logof the price level
=logof real income12
r =logof (1+1) (1 =nominalinterest rate)
(a>O) =incomeelasticity of money demand
(b>O) =minusthe negative elasticity of money demand with
respect to (1+i).5
k =constant.
If an identical "foreign" money demand function is specified with
"*"superscriptsindicating foreign values, subtracting from (6) the









MoneySupply: Sterilization and Intervention
Money supply is represented by a log linear money "production
function" which determines money supply in terms of domestic and foreign






=domesticassets of central bank in country "1"
X1 =foreignexchange reserves of central bank in country "1"
j1
=elasticityof money supply with respect to
=elasticityof money supply with respect to X1.13
In logs (8) becomes:
=
j1d1+ j2x1 (9)








=logof autonomous portion of domestic assets of central
j bankin country 1
st1
=sterlizationcoefficient in country 1 [St10 implies
full sterlization; St1 =1.0implies zero sterlization and
d1 =d1
]. t t
Intervention links reserves to the exchange rate where:
x1 =_'y1s (11)
measures the elasticity of official reserves with respect to the ex-
change rate, s. The faster currency 1 depreciates (a rise in s) the
faster country one reserves are lost (and the faster "foreign't reserves
rise). If analogous expressions apply for country 2, then the re—










If intervention dominates sterlization so that currency depreciation
lowers x1 and raisesx2 then 4)isunambiguously negative. If steri-
lization eradicates intervention's affect on the monetary base 4)= 0.
In this case =deand there is no need to take account of either
intervention or sterlization in modeling the money supply. The impor-
tant thing about (12) from the forecasting standpoint is the fact that
it links to "4)",thevalue of all reduced—forms describing the impact
upon the exchange rate of exogenous variables. And"4)"inturn depends
upon intervention and sterlization policy parameters y. and st
(i =1,2)which are likely to change over time.
Equations (7) and (12) along with purchasing power parity, in-
terest parity and the condition that the forward rate is an unbiased
measure of the public's expected spot rate enable a rational MERE solu-
tion for the exchange rate.
A General Formulation for PPP and "Real"
Exchange Rate Changes
Purchasing power parity is expanded here to include systematic
and random "real" exchange rate changes.15
s = — p)+ dz + u (13)
Here z represents a vector of real factors which systematically
operate to cause deviations from PPP while u represents non—systematic
divergences of the exchange rate from PPP.
Interest parity is written as:
(14)
where is the log of the forward domestic currency price of foreign
currency as of time "t" for time "t+l." Here "r's" refer to one plus
nominal interest rates on instruments of term "t" to "t+l." The simple
efficient market hypothesis states that under conditions of risk neu-





Equation (15) sets the forward rate at t?tI for time "t+l" equal to
the mathematical expectation of the spot rate at time "t+l" conditional
on the information set available at time "t."
A Solution for the Exchange Rate
Equations (14) and (15) imply:
e *
s—s =r —r t t+l t t t16
where se+1 E E[s+iJinformation]. Equation (16) can be substi-




—u.These substitutions along with expresssions
for money supply behavior enable a rational solution for the exchange









where AR—i processes define growth of exogenous variables
=d'-t—1 + Ud
(18.a)
=p + u (l8.b)





Withp all equal one (growth of exogenous variables a random walk),
letting a =1.0and ignoring, for now, z, the result is a basic form





where RXM [de —orrelative excess money supply.
Equation (18) implies a cyclical response of the exchange rate
to relative excess money supply (RXM). If sterlization cancels the
impact of intervention on the monetary base (=O), the elasticity
of the exchange rate with respect to RXM is (l+b), implying an initial
"overshoot" of amount "b" which is subsequently removed at t—1. Sharp-
ness of the cyclical response of the exchange rate to RXN is proportional
to the interest elasticity of money demand. This result is most easily
understood by first noting that interest parity, PPP and unbiasedness
of the forward rate as a predictor of the expected spot rate together
imply that Fisher equations describe nominal interest rates in each
country.6 These conditions are all implicit in (18). Given thesecon-
ditions a rise in RXM is exacerbated by a drop in money demand at home
relative to abroad which in turn results from higher nominal interest
rates at home relative to abroad. The latter results from a relative
increase in expected inflation at home. The size of the additional
negative effect on money demand depends on the size of b, the interest
elasticity of money demand. In short a rise in RXM feeds on itself by
causing anticipated inflation which lowers steady—state money demand.
Therefore the exchange rate must depreciate by more than a change in
RXM to reduce domestic excess money supply. Once the initial overshoot
reduces steady state real money balances at home, the extra pressure
on the exchange rate is removed and the overshoot portion of deprecia-
tion disappears.18
Intervention and Sterilization
These results are modified by intervention and/or sterilization.
In the longer run can not be zero, with intervention not allowed to
affect the monetary base. If the base is not affected by balance of
payments disequilibria under non—zero intervention reserve gains or
losses will persist until some rapid adjustment of exchange rates to
perceived equilibrium levels is permitted. This outcome implies that
attempts to hold=0will eventually cause y (intervention) to fall
until exchange rates reach perceived equilibrium levels. In any case,
can be expected to vary over time.
If intervention is heavy and 4takeson a large negative value,
the "overshoot" may seem to disappear, say over some sample period.
The reason will be the market's perception of intervention to prevent
exchange rate movement and not any "failure" of the monetary theory of
exchange rate determination. A believable announcement of or concrete
evidence of a significant change in intervention policy will alter ""
andthereby alter the measured impact upon the exchange rate during some
finite sample period of a given change in RXM. The basic MERE theory
which postulates a fixed impact would be contradicted by data drawn
for that sample period. The reason would not be invalidity of MERE
but rather failure to allow for a change in intervention (or sterili-
zation) policy.19
3. TESTING THE EXTENDED MERE MODEL
Implications of Theory
The theory developed in Section 2 anticipates some specific forms
of observable behavior. The response of exchange rates to components
of RXM should be cyclical. Separate components of R.XM may produce dif—
ferent cyclical impacts upon exchange rates due to: differences in
income elasticity of money demand (impact on response to real income
variables)7; and different projections of future, expected behavior of
determinants of RXM from observable current and lagged values.8 Over
time, estimatedparameteTs may vary due to changes in intervention and/or
sterilization policy.
The full sample period runs from March, 1973 through December,
1979. During that time there has been steady "real" depreciation of
the dollar against DM. As noted earlier, the log of the real dollar--DM
exchange rate follows a random walk during the 1973—79 sample period.
Therefore the rate of change of the exchange rate (log—first--difference)
obeys PPP. All variables discussed here are in log—first—difference
form. Any possible remaining systematic, temporal behavior of the
differenced dollar—DM exchange rate is captured by a noise model in the
transfer function estimates reported below. Given this formulation,
RX1I components must explain some part of the white—noise residuals of
a prefiltered series on the rate of change of the exchange rate. The
measure of relative inflation volatility on real relative risk (herein-
after "o") described earlier is also included as a possible source of
trealtt dollar—DM exchange rate movement to be held constant when con-
sidering the impact of RxM.920
Methodology
Transfer function estimation procedures following Box and Jenkins
(1970) were employed to estimate exchange rate equations. This methodo-
logy enables parsimonious representation of lengthy, cyclical distri-
buted—lag effects running from exogenous variables to the endogenous
variable along with simultaneous pre—filtering of the endogenous vari-
ables to ttwhite_noiseI by means of an AR, MA or ARMA model. In addi-
tion, cross—correlations between the endogenous variable and lagged
and leading values of the exogenous variables (pre—filtered to white
noise) can be obtained. The cross correlations for lagged exogenous
variables enable the investigator to see if any additional explanatory
power remains once some relationship between exogenous and endogenous
variables has been estimated. Cross correlations between the endogenous
variable and leading values of exogenous variables enable a check on
feedback running from the endogenous variable to later values of the
exogenous variable.
Initial estimation using 82 monthly observations running from
March, 1973 through December, 1979 indicated that most impact from exo-
genous to endogenous variables occurred (via numerator parameters)
contemporaneously and with a lag of one month. Further explanatory
power appeared to be distributed over a long lag. Therefore a para-
meter (second order denominator) was included to allow for a cyclical
distributed lag impact running from exogenous variables to the endo—
genous variables.21
Estimation Results
Table 1 reports on estimation of a transfer function model with
numerator parameters at lags zero and one (0—n. and 1—n.) and a second—
order denominator parameters (2—dn.). "Total gain" in Table 1 refers
to the full distributed—lag impact of the exogenous variable over a
period of damped, cyclical oscillations. The top portion of Table 1
excludes the relative risk (a) term while the lower portion includes it.
The impact of a is estimated by a numerator parameter at lag 3 only.
The estimation program employed estimates a maximum of 15 parameters
which left only one parameter attributable to relative risk)0
Obviously many alternative formulations including first and third—
order denominator parameters and other numerator parameters could pro-
duce an oscillatory distributed—lag impact running from RXN variables
to the exchange rate. Some were tried. Numerator parameters beyond
lag—one—month were generally insignificant (with the notable exception
of relative real risk). In most cases third—order denominator parameters
resulted in explosive oscillatory distributed lags for one or more RXM
variables. The formulation reported in Table 1 has uniformity and
relative simplicity to recommend it. However, any significant change in
intervention or sterilization policy can and will disturb the appro-
priate form of the model as we shall see be1ow.
Overall, Table 1 indicates that RXM variables explain some part
of dollar—DM exchange rate behavior in a manner predicted by MERE theory.
Still, a large part of exchange rate behavior is unexplained as indi-
cated by low R2's. F—tests of the overall significance of equations (1.1)
and (1.2) are very close to crucial values at the 5 percent level.TABLE 1
TRANSFERFUNCTION ESTIMATION OF THEDOLLARPRICE OF DM
(t—Statistics in Parentheses)
Equation (1.1) (Real Risk Omitted)
R2(R2) =0.26(0.12)F(l3,66) =1.83[F°513,16 =1.87:1Cons.: 0.0150
Exog. Var. 0—n. 1—n. 2—dn. Total Gain
d(1,2) 0.1438 0.3696 —0.2286
US (1.04) (2.60) (0.59)
0.4179
0.2405 —0.2772 —0.8676
US (0.61) (0.72) (2.96)
—0.0196











Equation (l.2)(Including Real Risk)
R () = 0.28(0.13)F(14,65) =1.84[F°514,65 =1.85]Cons.: —0.0168
d 0.1639 0.3805 —0.2795
US (1.23) (2.78) (0.79)
0.4255
y 0.3144 —0.3600 —0.8443 US (0.79) (0.90) (3.23)
—0.0248
d —0.0219 0.0226 —0.6414
g (2.49) (2.41) (3.06)
0.0004
y 0.0262 0.1903 0.9864






NOTES:(1) All variablesare in log—first—difference.
(2)"d" measuresthe log of the domestic portion of the monetary
base. For both the U.S. and Germany, the domestic portion of
the monetary base Is measured by "monetary authority reserve
money (line 14) less "monetary authority foreign assets"
(line 11) in IMF International Financial Statistics.
(3) "y" is "industrial—production" (line 66c of IFS).
(4) The spot exchange rate s is taken from the Harris Bank Tape of
international financial statistics. Data are as of the last
available reporting day of the month.
(5) Numerator parameter at lag 3 only.22
It is clear from Table 1 that a serious mis—specification is very
likely to result from the coon practice of estimating exchange rate
equations which impose the same absolute parameter values on coeff i—
dents attached to domestic and foreign money and income variables.
Dollar appreciation from U.S. income growth, y, is far less than DM
appreciation implied by German income growth,
Yg•
This result is con-
sistent with the higher income elasticity of money demand in Germany
alluded to earlier. Likewise, dollar depreciation from U.S. money ex-
pansion, d, is considerably above the level of DM depreciation im-
plied by German money expansion, dg•
Part of the U.S.—German difference in the estimated elasticity
of the exchange rate with respect to the domestic portion of the mone-
tary base results from the fact that during the 1973—79 sample period,
the elasticity of the U.S. money supply (M—2) with respect to d was
about 3 times that for Germany. Even adjusting for this, however, the
conclusion remains that U.S. money—base or money growth has resulted
in more dollar depreciation than the DM—depreciation resulting from
German money—base or money growth.
The estimated impact on the exchange rate of a rise in German
money is quite robust. Initial DM depreciation is followed, in 1 month,
by almost equal appreciation and subsequent cycling which eventually
leaves only a very small net impact on the rate. The total gain changes
sign from equation (1.1) to equation (1.2). This is an odd result which
is due proximately to the form of the estimated oscillatory distributed—
lag impact of dg on the exchange rate. More fundamentally the small
overall response of the exchange rate to d, especially when compared23
to the response to d, maybedue to the tendency of German money
growth to revert to a stable mean over the sample period while U.S.
money growth rates have tended to accelerate. The latter implies far
more anticipated inflation from a given rise in money growth and,
therefore, more currency depreciation.
"Relative risk" change is meant to proxy for a real interest rate
change in Germany relative to the U.S. Equation (1.2) indicates the
anticipated DM appreciation resulting from a rise in •althoughthe esti-
mated coefficient differs from zero at only about the 20 percent level
of significance.
Feedback From Exchange Rates to Exogenous Variables
Table 2 reports Box—Pierce test statistics for autocorrelation
and cross correlation of variables in equation (1.2). Perhaps most
notable is the indicated feedback running from the exchange rate to
the domestic portion of the U.S. monetary base. Examination of the
cross correlations between pre—filtered s and pre—filtered d mdi—
us
cates significant feedback at lags of 2 and 11 months. The indication,
in conjunction with estimated intervention equations to be discussed
below, is that when dollar depreciation against the DM results in
official U.S. "leaning against the wind" and a consequent loss of
reserves, part or all of the impact on the monetary base is removed
by a rise in d. Estimated intervention and money supply functions
for the United States indicate that during the 1973—79 sample period
implied sterilization by the U.S. more than offset the impact ofTABLE 2
CR1—SQUARETESTS
(Box—Pierce Statistic—Adjusted For Downward Bias)
(For Equation 1.2)
Autocorrelation: Degrees of Freedotn P—Value
Q(12) =7.09 11 .791




s(0,12) =7.24 10 .703
S(0,24) =14.3 21 .857
(2) sondus
S(—1,—l2) =30.0 12 .00279
S(—l,—24) =41.1 24 .0162
(3) us s
S(0,12) =8.70 10 .561
s(0,24) =14.0 21 .872
(4)s
S(—1,—12) =22.8 12 .0299
S(—l,—24) =38.3 24 .0324
(5) d ons
S(0,12) =14.2 10 .164
S(0,24) =25.9 21 .211
(6) sondg
S(—1,—12) =18.7 12 .096
S(—1,—24) =34.0 24 .084
(7) Ygons
S(0,12) =17.7 10 .061
S(0,24) =22.2 21 .388
(Continued)TABLE 2 (Continued)
Cross—Correlation: (Cont'd) Degrees of Freedom P—Value
SOfl Yg
s(—l,—12) =13.1 12 .359
s(—l,—24) =23.2 24 .507
(8) aons
s(0,12) =7.76 12 .803
S(0,24) =21.1 23 .573
(9) sona
S(—l,—12) =8.95 12 .707
S(—l,—24) =16.2 24 .88124
intervention on the monetary base. In addition there is some mdi—
cation of sterilization feedback from s to d at lag 3 months. These
g
results suggest a further explanation for the powerful impact of changes
in don the exchange rate indicated in Table 1.If exchange rate
movements are blunted by intervention behavior which is not allowed
to produce a stabilizing impact on the monetary base, excess money
supply conditions created by a rise in dcan be expected to persist
for some time. The powerful response of the exchange rate to a rise
in dthat is indicated in Table 1 reflects the expectation that us
effects upon the U.S. monetary base arising from "leaning against the
wind" by U.S. authorities will be overwhelmed by sterilization.
Some feedback from the exchange rate to U.S. industrial produc-
tion is also indicated in Table 2. Strong positive feedback appears
at a lag of 5 months. It may be that dollar depreciation which ini-
tially "overshoots" is sharp enough to stimulate a real increase in
demand for U.S. exports which in turn requires a rise in industrial
production.
Changes in Intervention and Sterilization Policy
The extended MERE model suggests that changes in intervention
and sterilization policy within a sample period ought to alter the
measured impact upon the exchange rate of changes in money, real income
and other disturbances. The first step to check for this possibility
was to estimate "leaning against the wind" intervention equations for
the U.S. and Germany for the full March, 1973 —December,1979 sample
period.11 Then the sample period was sp]it after December 1975.25
This split, as noted by Bilson (1979), is suggested by the December,
1975 meetings at Rambouillet where major countries attempted to formu-
late some exchange—rate—policy "rules of the game." Intervention
equations of the form obtained for the full sample period were then
estimated for the March, 1973 —December,1975 period and the January,
1976 —December,1979 period.
For the United States it was not possible to reject the null
hypothesis that the intervention model was unchanged. The relevant
F—statistic calculated was 1.03, well below the critical value of
1.93 required for rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5 percent
level of significance. For Germany, it was possible to reject the
null hypothesis of unchanged intervention at the 5 percent level
(calculated F =2.81versus critical 5 percent F =2.74).
Inspection of cross correlations of residuals for the sub—periods
suggested that sterilization policy for both Germany and the United
States was largely unchanged between the two sub—periods.
German intervention became more pronounced during the latter part
of the sample period. A one percent change in the exchange rate was
accompanied by a nearly one percent change in reserves in the January,
1976 —December,1979 period. The comparable "elasticity of interven-
tion" in the March, 1973 —December,1975 period was only about one—
third. For the full period [March, 1973 —December,19791 the estimated
"elasticity of intervention" for Germany was about 0.5.
An attempt to estimate equations (1.1) and (1.2) in Table 1 for
the shorter sample periods clearly indicated that the fit of the model
employed over the full period deteriorated sharply in the sub—periods.26
A major difficulty was the implied oscillatory distributed lag impact
running from money and income variables to the exchange rate. In a
number of cases it became explosive. Another problem is likely the
fact that the shorter sample periods afforded few degrees of freedom.
Given the need to estimate 15 parameters only 15 degrees of freedom
exist for the early period and 29, for the later period. Therefore,
these results are far from conclusive. The suggestion which remains
is the possibility that significant changes in intervention policy can
and may have altered the "true" values of reduced—form parameters
within the 1973—79 sample period. The results for the full sample
period reflect a composite of distinct intervention policies in each
of the sub—periods.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The primary aim of this paper has been to deal with shortcomings
of extant empirical tests of the monetary approach to exchange rate
determination. Four major difficulties exist:(1) Failure to deal
explicitly with real exchange rate changes; (2)Failure to impose
interest parity; (3) Failure to represent the forward rate as an
unbiased predictor of the spot rate; and (4) Failure to model impli-
cations of official intervention in foreign exchange markets and of
possible efforts to sterilize effects of intervention on the monetary
base.
Theoretical discussion of exchange rate behavior by other investi-
gators has dealt adequately with the first three failures and the27
fourth has been addressed in Makin (1980). But empirical investiga-
tions have tended to incorporate at least one failure and usually,
all four, as in the representation by Dornbusch (1980) of an empiri-
cal test of the monetary approach. It would be inappropriate, on the
basis of poorly formulated empirical tests, to abandon the monetary
approach to exchange rate determination, distinguished by its analyti-
cal tractability and derivative refutable hypotheses expressed in terms
of directly observable variables.
Results of empirical tests conducted here do not permit rejection
of the complex joint hypothesis represented by equations estimated to
test the monetary approach. In spite of this, there remained unexplained
a large portion of the behavior of the dollar—DM exchange rate in the
1973—79 monthly sample employed. This fact is not inconsistent with
the view that exchange rates are prices determined in asset markets
where a large, unsystematic flow of information, not captured by mone-
tary or other variables, produces large, unsystematic movements of
exchange rates.
Results reported here are proximte1y at variance with those of
Caves and Feige (1980). They found that, in the presence of explanatory
power of an exchange rate's own past history, monetary variables have
no additional explanatory power. They also employed, as this study does,
log—first—differences of all variables. They considered a different
(U.S.—Canadian dollar) exchange rate. The main difference is their
failure to measure excess money supply and to allow for different,
reduced—form coefficients measuring the impact of money on exchange
rates. In short, the difference between results reported here and28
those of Caves and Feige maywellbe due to problems of specification
error and omitted variables.
The extended MERE model of exchange rate behavior which includes
"leaning against the wind" intervention suggests hypotheses about be-
havior of international capital flows as well as exchange rates. A
basic balance of payments identity which sets the change in official
reserves (intervention) equal to the sum of private capital flows and
the current account combined with the extended—MERE, exchange rate model
yields a theory of international capital flows. Capital flows, like
exchange rates, can be shown to depend only on the current expectation
of all future, relative excess money supplies. Makin and Nelson (1981)
find that a measure of excess money supply produces the predicted
cyclical response of U.S. international capital flows over the 1969—80
sample period. Explanatory power of the transfer function is consi-
derably higher than that of the exchange rate equation. This is likely
due partly to the fact that the dependent variable is a quantity mea-
sure sampled quarterly instead of a price measure sampled over a finer,
monthly interval. If asset prices are absorbing a large part of the
impact of random information shocks, measured flows which reallocate
assets may be more related to behavior of systematic information such
as measures of relative excess money.
There remains considerably more work to be done if exchange rate
behavior in an era of quasi—floating is to be fully understood. It
would be useful to isolate more of the systematic, measurable and
testable sources of "real" exchange rate movements. The role of risk29
premia discussed in Makin (1980) needs to be more fully understood.
As more data from the quasi—floating period after March, 1973 become
available, it will be necessary to investigate further the implica-
tions for exchange rate behavior of any identifiable changes in inter-
vention and/or sterilization policy.30
FOOTNOTES
* Thanksare due to Charles Nelson and to students in my seminar
on Advanced Macroeconomics for help in distilling ideas presented
here. Responsibility for any errors is my own.
1. Dornbusch (1980) uses unanticipated depreciation of the dollar
against the yen and DM, but as is clear from his Figure 3 (p. 160)
this is almost the same as actual depreciation since most deprec-
iation was unanticipated.
2. Dornbusch (1980), Footnote to Table 4, p. 162.
3. Equation (3) maycontaina time trend as in:
=a+ t+
Inthis case some "time" proxy would appear in (4) or a low
Durbin—Watson statistic would likely result in differencing.
4. Frenkel (1977) among others provides convincing evidence regarding
unbiasedness of the forward rate as a predictor of the spot rate
(exchange market efficiency). However, Tryon (1979) finds that the
forward market fails to supply an unbiased predictor of the change
in the future spot rate in 4 of 6 cases examined. While failure
of this more stringent test of market efficiency does not expli-
citly violate the usual efficiency condition employed here, Tryon's
results raise questions worthy of note and further investigation.
5. "b" will be slightly below interest elasticity of money demand with
respect to "i", with the difference falling as i rises. The
"1 + i" formulation turns out to be particularly convenient for
capturing interest parity and introduces no substantive changes
in the nature of money demand.
6. This condition holds given a constant ratio of domestic to foreign
real interest rates.31
7. Estimation of U.S. and German money demand equations for the
sample period under investigation revealed German income elas-
ticity of money demand (about 1.5) significantly above that
for the U.S. (about 0.4). This implies that real growth in
Germany ought to strengthen the DM by more than growth in the
U.S. strengthens the dollar.
8. In terms of the model, the "p" values describing the (AR—i)
growth path of exogenous variables may differ. Alternatively,
a more complex ARMA model may imply alternative cyclical re-
sponse patterns.
9. A measure of a was obtained as follows. First, an ARMA model
was estimated for the producer price index in the U.S. and
Germany. A monthly moving average of contemporary and six
lagged residuals was calculated for the 1973—79 sample period
for each country. The German series less the U.S. series is a.
The rationale behind aissimple. The larger are current
and past residuals on a forecasting equation for prices, the
more uncertainty there is about future price levels and antici-
pated inflation. More uncertainty requires a risk premium for
local country holders of local currency assets who are risk—
averse. The higher real return measured in the local currency
attracts foreign investors.
10. Some experimentation was conducted with alternative formulations
enabling a denominator parameter for relative risk (by dropping32
one of the numerator parameters on another variable). Results
did not alter conclusions reported here, although in some cases
the change in specification caused explosive oscillatory distri-
buted lags to be estimated for RXM variables.
11.Equations estimated were transfer functions with noise models.
The dependent variable was the rate of change of monetary authority
reserve money (IFS, line 14). The independent variable was a
distributed lag on the rate of change of the dollar—DM exchange
rate. In the case of the U.S. the dollar—yen exchange rate proved
to be highly significant along with the dollar—DM rate unexplain—
ing intervention.33
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